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A Cognitive Theory of the Aesthetic Experience
  Gianluca Consoli 
Abstract
This paper aims at naturalizing the aesthetic experience on the
basis of cognitive sciences.  In traditional philosophical
aesthetics, the aesthetic experience requires a specific attitude
and a characteristic work of imagination.  Today, cognitive
sciences offer a rich set of empirically corroborated concepts
useful in explaining these notions in naturalistic terms.  This
paper extends these concepts to explain how the aesthetic
experience is integrated and how it affords knowledge.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores the possibility of naturalizing the aesthetic
experience (AE).  A preliminary obstacle to this project is the
definition of both ’naturalization’ and ‘AE.’  To start, this paper
is based on empirical data and theoretical frames derived from
cognitive sciences and biology.  The proposed naturalization
aims at selecting salient theses of traditional and
contemporary aesthetics about the AE, translating them into a
scientific language, making them into more precise and
accurate hypotheses with stronger explicative power.
Secondly, in traditional and contemporary aesthetics, various
controversies surround the characterization, the epistemic
value, even the existence of the AE.  First and foremost, the
notion of AE covers a wide range of experiences (visual,
literary, musical, auditory, motor, etc.) and phenomena
(natural phenomena, functional objects, aesthetic artifacts,
works of art, etc.).  Is the AE a specific and unitary
experience?  The proposed naturalization identifies the
common core of the AE.  Among the main components of the
AE discussed by traditional and contemporary aesthetics are
the aesthetic attitude (EA) subjects assume to interact with
aesthetic objects and the work of imagination subjects develop
to interpret aesthetic objects.  The paper argues that (a) the
AA exists and represents a specific kind of attitude that can be
understood in terms of pseudo-modularity; (b) the work of
imagination, prompted by aesthetic objects, produces and
justifies modal knowledge; and (c) linked together, the AA and
the aesthetic imagination constitute the common core of the
AE.
However, this common core has multiple realizations.  There
are prototypical examples of it (i.e. the great works of art);
partial realizations (i.e. aesthetic artifacts such as decoration
in primitive society and design in contemporary society);
peripheral implementations (such as rituals in primitive society
and Happenings in contemporary society).  Because the artistic
experience represents a prominent example of the AE, the
paper describes the common core of the AE taking art as the
reference point.  In particular the description has to do with
paradigmatic examples of (visual and literary) works of art.
We will also refer to natural phenomena, aesthetic artifacts,
and some practices of primitive and contemporary art.  These
examples are useful for suggesting how the proposed
naturalization can be further extended to these phenomena.
 However, they are not complete explanations.
2. The aesthetic attitude
In the perspective of evolutionary psychology, the mind is
constituted by a large number of modules, domain-specific
neurocognitive subsystems.  Each of these subsystems,
selected through  an evolutionary process, develops in
ontogeny. For this reason, a subsystem can operate in two
different ways:  in the functional mode when it performs its
evolved function, or in the organizational mode when
processes are designed to construct the adaptation.  The AE is
driven by adaptations operating in their organizational mode.
 For instance, many natural invariant phenomena, such as fire,
stars, faces and landscapes, are judged attractive because
their invariant properties allow them to furnish information
and to activate procedures that help construct our visual
system.  Therefore the AE experience does not solve problems
in the external world but produces adaptive changes in our
internal organization.[1]
A similar point is also made in the enactive approach.[2]
According to this perspective, experience is a skillful activity
and functions in two different modes:  the mode of
transparency, when routine processing gives access to the
world as a domain of facts; and the mode of activity, when
subjects inhibit automatic responses, explore the world as a
domain of affordances, and reflect on their experience.
Aesthetic artifacts afford occasions for this sort of enactive
experience.  Many contemporary works of art are devices
intentionally designed to block ordinary sensory-motor
operations, attract attention, and trigger an open process of
categorization.[3]
The AE is an organizational adaptation, a skillful activity, a
temporally extended episode that involves perceptual,
cognitive, imaginative, affective and emotional processes.  A
basic question this paper asks is which condition gives unity to
this complex process?  Which condition structures this large
number of specialized systems into an integrated experience
able to change our mind?  According to our thesis, the
fundamental disposition that ties together the aesthetic
operations is represented by the activation of a specific mental
attitude, the AA.  As a basic framework, this attitude
coordinates the involved activities in consistent and continuous
cycles of self-reinforced feedback, organizing an integrated
experience.  From this perspective, the AA is activated before
the experience with aesthetic objects really begins.  Then
during the experience, the AA remains active, supporting the
information processing dedicated to understanding and
interpreting aesthetic objects, their contents and details.
The AA realizes the function of integration, implementing (in a
specific form) properties that are common to all the attitudes
as such. As social psychology suggests,[4] attitudes influence
all subsequent information processing, from the early stage of
perception to the late stage of storage in memory.  Empirical
research reveals (a) selective exposition: subjects search for
information consistent with their attitudes; (b) selective
attention: subjects focus on information relevant to their
expectations, ignoring other stimuli; (c) selective
interpretation: subjects transform ambiguous information in
order for it to conform to their expectations; (d) selective
memory: attitudes represent heuristic criteria to organize both
storing and recall; and (e) selective inferences: subjects make
inferences, attributions and judgments consistent with their
attitudes, especially if these are easily accessible and stable.
There is a further analogy with the attitudes as such:  the AA
may be activated in two different modes.  Social neuroscience
suggests that attitudes may be activated automatically and
spontaneously, or intentionally and deliberatively.[5]  The
different modes of activation depend both on the subject’s
motivation and contextual opportunities.  The AA is often taken
automatically on the basis of objective properties (i.e.
symmetry, perceptual meaning or conceptual complexity) or
on the basis of familiarity with some conventions (i.e. the
exposition in a museum or the presentation with a title).
 However, the AA may also be taken intentionally, for instance
when aesthetic objects show new properties or are exhibited
outside the institutional world of art.  In these cases subjects
employ explicit deliberation to recognize aesthetic objects.
These are the common properties the AA shares with attitudes
as such.  However, the AA has an original and unique form.
 This form is determined by a set of properties caused by an
original functioning of attention, consciousness, belief
dynamics, and motivation.  Aesthetic tradition has identified
these properties; today we can explain them in terms of
empirically corroborated concepts derived from cognitive
sciences.
The AA influences the global functioning of attention.  First,
subjects direct their conscious attention to the aesthetic
object, its aspects, properties and contents.  They identify with
it in a global effort involving different mental faculties.  In
contrast, in a distracted perception, subjects do not really
encounter any aesthetic objects; they do not have a proper
relation with them.  The focus of attention is not enough to
have a specific genre of experience.  Secondly, the aesthetic
object inhibits the daily routines that usually guide action,
perception and inference.  These routines concern the entire
process of recognition, from early sensory-motor operations to
subsequent symbolic categorization.  They are learned through
repeated implementations in similar contexts and are activated
without conscious control.[6]  When we try to understand The
Empire of Light
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Empire_of_Light)  or The
Persistence of Memory
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Persistence_of_Memory),
the ordinary perceptual routines do not match (at least
immediately and directly) the pattern of cues, aspects and
contents displayed by the paintings.  Therefore they are
blocked, their activation is no longer automatic and
spontaneous.  The same happens to the ordinary inferential
routines when we try to understand The Man without Qualities
or Ulysses.  Ordinary routines require conscious processing
and deliberate control. In this way subjects become aware of
them and of their automatic functioning in ordinary cognition.
This process is very similar to traditional Formalist
defamiliarization: aesthetic objects are strange, extraordinary
and special insofar as they force the suspension of ordinary
beliefs, set the mind in a state of openness, prolong the
process of perception and, finally, improve the understanding
of the familiar.
The AA influences the global functioning of consciousness. The
AE is intentional and transitive:  it is directed toward an object,
it represents the object under selective intentional modes, and
it grasps the aspectual shape of the object.[7] In particular,
the intentionality of the AA increases the focus/fringe,
center/periphery, figure/ground dynamics of consciousness.  In
general, the working memory and its temporary storage have
limited resources:  the central executive can manipulate only a
few elements; much information is unconsciously processed
outside the intentional focus; many details are lost.[8]  During
the AE, subjects cannot collect all the relevant information
immediately with a single act of consciousness.  They explore
the aesthetic object in a serial manner, with continuous
feedback between bottom-up and top-down processes.  For
instance, this is the typical process prompted by the Cubist
paintings.  With a brief, primary exposure, fast forward
processing allows primary and simple access to the paintings.
 These do not meet daily expectations and require more time
and scrutiny.  Top-down control guides attention backward to
the input level.  
Subjects have access to further relevant information and
modify their previous, high-level representation.  With this
fine-grained representation as a mental reference point, a new
cycle of attention-driven backward search is activated. Other
details embedded in the paintings function as cues of
unexpected and surprising associations and meanings. Often,
too, associations and meanings are competing and only
partially compatible.  For instance, characters and situations of
Kafka and Beckett resist complete fusion in a single frame of
interpretation.  This open movement is very similar to the
hermeneutical circle.  The attention is directed both
analytically to the components of the aesthetic object, and
synthetically to the aesthetic object as a whole, with a tension
that avoids repetition and boredom.  A complete resolution is
not achieved: following considerable inspection, subjects
decide to stop the exploration when they judge that their
understanding is appropriate.
The inhibition of routinized processing, the increased
focus/fringe dynamic, and the analytical and synthetic
direction of attention make the intentional and transitive
processes of the AA not completely transparent.  Ordinarily,
when attention is directed toward an object, subjects do not
focus on transitive consciousness and its properties.[9]  On
the contrary, during the aesthetic exploration subjects become
aware not only of the object’s properties but also of the acts of
consciousness.  The entire process of de-automatized
exploration aimed at understanding the aesthetic object is
made conscious. So the AE is at once an immersed, first-
order, object-focused experience and a detached, second-
order, self-focused experience.
The AA influences the global functioning of belief dynamics.
The AE may have different kinds of props (literary, pictorial or
sculptural, etc.) and so it may involve beliefs with different
formats, both sub-symbolic (bodily, perceptual or affective)
and symbolic.  Whatever format they have, all of these beliefs
share the same fictional and non-referential status. Triggered
by aesthetic objects, these beliefs are not referentially
constrained.  Like beliefs in playful pretense and symbolic
games,[10] aesthetic beliefs are marked off and quarantined:
 subjects keep them separate from ordinary beliefs because
the aesthetic beliefs are decoupled from the actual state of the
world and are not really believed. However, although aesthetic
beliefs do not correspond to any actual state of affairs, they
are not opposed to factual truth as false beliefs are.  They are
not errors, illusions, lies, deceptions or manipulations.
 Aesthetic beliefs are belief-like imaginings aiming at the
fictional: real world truth condition are irrelevant.[11]  In this
way, interacting with the aesthetic object, subjects maintain a
persistent focus only on it, ignoring referential constraints and
real word truth conditions.  So they suppress routinized and
reality-oriented responses and are prompted to explore a
range of opportunities and possibilities afforded by the
aesthetic object.
Historically, this perspective stems from the concept of
mimesis developed by Aristotle as a specific form of cognition,
more general than factual and contingent truth. In recent
years, the pragmatic definitions of fiction and the theories of
fiction based on the notion of make-believe have highlighted
the difference between fiction qua different types of falsehood
and aesthetic fiction qua specific form of imagination and not
opposed to truth.[12]
The AA influences the global functioning of motivation. During
the AA, motivation is distinguished on two levels.  In the
background, the epistemic goal of knowledge represents the
basic motivation of subjects.  The goal of knowledge is
terminal, fixed and inborn. Humans are “informavores:”  our
mind has evolved to seek and consume information in an
endless search.[13]  As we will see below (section 4), in the
AE this goal is oriented to learning through a direct interaction
with the aesthetic object.  This particular realization of the
epistemic goal supports the specific goals activated by the
exploratory activity.  Whereas the epistemic goal is actual,
these specific goals are derived from the aesthetic object and
are simulated off-line.  Subjects pretend to adopt them.  They
feed the goals into their own decision mechanism without
producing any effective decision or behavior.  
For instance, when subjects try to understand fictional
characters, they accept the game of make-believe and realize
a perspective shift: they suspend the egocentric map, re-
center it on the allocentric map, imagining as if they have
adopted the character’s goals.  Because of the interaction
between the basic goal of knowledge and the off-line goals,
the aesthetic information processing is not motivated by
instrumental goals.  Subjects do not have personal goals,
ordinary desires or practical needs.  Their mental activity
develops freely, guided only by the structure and the
properties of the aesthetic object.
The fictional and non-utilitarian nature of the AE represents
what aesthetic tradition calls “disinterestedness” (Kant) or
“psychical distance”(Bullough):  it involves detachment from
referential conditions and from daily concerns but not
disengagement from knowing and learning.
3. Integration and pseudo-modularity
The specific functioning of attention, consciousness, beliefs and
motivation identifies the condition that makes the AA a
particular genre of attitude.  However, deepening the initial
question, how can the AA coordinate these multiple processes
in order to produce an integrated experience?  Cognitive
sciences, in particular research concerning modularity, offer a
conceptual frame to answer this question. It is our thesis that
the AA is a specific kind of macro-modular organization.
Generally modules are domain-specific, special purpose
mechanisms dedicated to solve a particular class of problems.
 Modules are biological mechanisms shaped through evolution. 
Natural selection copes with environmental pressure in a
piecemeal fashion.  Hence, there is not a prototype module,
but various kinds of modules, with different forms, functions
and properties.  For this reason, researchers tend to have
diverse conceptions of modular architecture.  So far it is not
clear to what extent modules are interrelated and to what
extent they play a role in central cognition, which is flexible
and context-sensitive.[14]  However, in the strong conception,
modules have important informational constraints.[15]  First,
they have a proper domain, all the information the module is
biologically designed to process (i.e. face recognition).  
Proper domains are defined by specific input conditions that
activate mandatory, involuntary, passive and fast operations
through a genetically channeled ontogenetic development.
Second, modules are inaccessible:  other systems have access
only to the final results and not to the internal operations (i.e.
Chomskyan grammatical competence).  Third, they are
encapsulated and cognitively impenetrable: modules have
limited databases and use only a limited subset of the
information processed by other systems, even if this
information is relevant (i.e. visual illusion).
The main modular property of the AA is an informational
constraint similar to a soft encapsulation.  When subjects
assume the AA they suspend both reference and real world
truth conditions.  In this way, aesthetic processing is realized
within a sort of fictional box.[16]  Subjects know that beliefs,
like representations, are not factually true because they do not
correspond to any actual state of affairs.  However
encapsulation inhibits access to this knowledge.  Therefore,
subjects can focus only on fictional representations; they can
use off-line reasoning mechanisms; they can simulate goals
outside the egocentric map.  This encapsulation is soft because
it does not depend on fixed architectural constraints.  Even
when it is automatically triggered, the aesthetic encapsulation
can be overridden at any time, explicitly recalling the fictional
nature of representations.  In addition, this kind of
encapsulation is not entirely cognitively impenetrable.  The
knowledge of the fictional status of representations is always
active in the periphery of consciousness.  Otherwise subjects,
might lose track of this status and confuse the fictional
universe with the real world.
The aesthetic encapsulation is modular insofar as it
coordinates and integrates the diverse processes of aesthetic
processing in a unified fictional box.  It has specific modular
properties, insofar as it is voluntary and only relatively closed.
 The AA has other important pseudo-modular properties.
As a macro-modular organization, the AA facilitates global
accessibility among the large number of systems activated by
aesthetic objects.  Perceptual, affective and cognitive systems
share the relevant information in order to understand
aesthetic objects; once a content is established by a system, it
is broadcast to the others.  From this perspective, the fictional
box allows a blackboard to interact with aesthetic objects in
order to integrate information coming from diverse specialized
modules.  However, systems do not communicate only results.
 In addition, each system has a direct influence on the internal
operation of the others.  
This influence is not directed towards the more peripheral
stages of a system’s internal processing.  As in ordinary
cognition, peripheral stages are inaccessible.[17]  Rather, the
influence involves the intermediate processing levels of each
system and produces the cycles of forward and backward
exploration described above.  In this dynamic, a distributed
network of modality-specific representations shapes the
organization of conceptual knowledge of aesthetic objects.  In
turn, conceptual information guides and orchestrates motor
and sensory explorations of aesthetic objects.  Therefore, the
fictional box allows a workspace framework to combine
multimodal operations for action, perception and
proprioception with the organization of conceptual contents,
semantic categories and abstract information.  In the AE
results, the system’s internal operations and mental faculties
are intimately intertwined in a unitary experience.
The domain specificity of the AA is not confined to a
determined category of objective properties. Contemporary art
(i.e. ready-mades, conceptual art) has shown that aesthetic
properties represent an open set that is not restricted to
traditional aesthetic properties, such as beauty, symmetry,
proportion, and so on.[18]  Therefore, even if we suppose a
proper biological domain of the AE defined by natural
preferences that allows the construction of adaptations, we
must recognize the mismatch between this proper domain and
its actual domain.  In general, the actual domain is defined by
inputs that imitate biological input conditions (i.e. face
recognition devices are activated also by masks and portraits).
 Actual domains are often inflated by cultural domains, that is
culturally generated information that satisfies input
conditions.[19]  In a similar way, the AA is activated by a
culturally expanded domain of historical practices, without
stable and fixed boundaries.  
Duchamp’s Fountain
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fountain_%28Duchamp%29),
Warhol’s series of Campbell Soup
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell%27s_Soup_Cans), and
Found Art are extreme examples of objects and artifacts
accepted as works of art only on the basis of cultural
conventions (in Danto’s terms, transfigurations).  Therefore,
this activation becomes automatic, unintentional, and to a
certain degree mandatory only throughout a continuous
learning process. In this perspective, although the AE is a
biological adaptation, it is far from genetically prefigured.
 During ontogenetic development, abilities such as drawing,
dancing and music mature according to similar stages.
 However, precisely because the AE depends on cultural
inputs, it assumes different cultural forms and different
individual levels of expertise in artistic expression and
appreciation.
4. Aesthetic imagination and knowledge
The AE is an innate, universal adaptation that has been
extended historically with the explosion of cultural stimuli. The
initial basic question now becomes:  if the AE, intended as an
integrated experience, represents an adaptation, what is its
evolved function?  The answer lies in the relationship between
aesthetic imagination and knowledge. According to our
cognitivist view of aesthetic function, the AE is a specific
realization of the epistemic goal of knowledge. It constitutes a
re-functionalization of previous phylogenetic systems
(perceptual, affective, linguistic, etc.) in order to acquire
knowledge through a decoupled (non-referential, playful,
simulative, disinterested, non-utilitarian) experience.
For the sake of simplicity, we call this experience “fiction
making” and we intend “fiction” in the specific sense of section
2 (non-reality oriented and independent of practical
functionality).  So the question is, can we know through fiction
making?  On the basis of typical criticisms,[20] this question
entails three different challenges.  The knowledge challenge:
can fiction making generate knowledge?  The warrant
challenge:  can fiction making justify knowledge? The
proficiency challenge:  can fiction making extend knowledge in
a proficient mode?  On the basis of cognitive sciences, it does
seem possible to formulate for each challenge a positive thesis
corroborated by crucial evidence.
Knowledge challenge.  How can fiction afford knowledge if it
has no contact with reality?  The science of fiction, which is a
new field of research in cognitive psychology, shows how this
can be possible.  A body of crucial experiments concerning
fictional narrative found that exposure to fiction, unlike
exposure to non-fiction, (a) predicts a more positive
performance on a variety of social ability measures (frequent
readers of fiction tend to have better abilities of empathy,
social inferences, and theory of mind);[21] (b) is positively
correlated with social support;[22] and (c) causes greater
change in self-reported experience of personality traits and
emotions.[23]  
In addition, the science of fiction explains how fiction can
afford knowledge.  Simulative experience through fiction
facilitates the process of growth and maturation of mind
reading.  Fictional narrative compresses models of the social
world, a complex constituted by multiple processes in
interaction.  From these processes arise emergent properties
that can not be predicted in advance from the low-level
possible interactions.  Fiction follows the trajectory of such
possibilities, thus providing concrete simulative experiences
that improve mind reading and the understanding of the social
world.[24]
Mind reading constitutes a set of social-cognitive skills (such
as direct simulation, role taking, analogical inferences and
theorizing on the basis of folk psychology) for understanding
others as intentional agents and for engaging in shared
activities (such as joint attention, collaborative cooperation, or
symbolic communication).  These skills are responsible for the
unique form of human social organization, based on cultural
learning and cultural creation.  In this perspective, from the
point of view of ontogeny, fiction represents an indispensable
means of becoming a cultural being.  In effect, young children
from the second half of their second year enter into the
collective intentionality of fictional worlds in early pretend play,
understood as a meaningful activity.[25]  
In addition, it is important to stress that joint pretend play
involves all kinds of imaginings:  bodily, sensory, affective,
and so on.  On this basis, the empirical results concerning
fictional narratives collected by the science of fiction can, in
principle, be generalized to all kinds of imaginings, not only
propositional, and to all forms of aesthetic artifacts, not only
fictional narratives.  For instance, from the point of view of the
pictorial representation, psychology of art has shown that even
figurative paintings do not have the status of copies and
imitations.[26]  Instead, both figurative and abstract paintings
constitute imaginative explorations concerning the sensory-
motor contingencies of visual experience, the non-conceptual
contents of perception, the what-it-is-like effects, the non-
propositional and propositional interplay.
From the cognitive sciences perspective it does seem possible
to propose the principle of affordance.  The AE does not
provide factual descriptions:  through aesthetic artifacts,
subjects do not extend their knowledge of truths about the
actual world.  They do not know actual and real facts.  On the
contrary, the AE enables modal knowledge of and about
possibility:  through aesthetic artifacts, subjects extend their
knowledge of affordances provided by the world as an open
and endless domain of possible skillful activities.  Therefore,
the cognitive value of the AE refers to the exploration of
conceptual spaces of possibilities on the basis of the
imagination.  In the AE subjects do not access the world as a
factual domain of state of affairs.  They encounter it as a
generative domain of opportunities for exploration.
Warrant challenge.  Even if the AE affords true beliefs, how
can fiction justify beliefs?  Cognitive sciences show how this
can be possible.  Beliefs and imaginings have different
functions.  Beliefs represent the world as it is.  Imaginings
represent what the world would be like given some set of
belief-like assumptions.  However, beliefs and imaginings can
have the same content, format and code.  Thus, once belief-
like representations enter inference and reasoning
mechanisms, these respond much as they do to parallel
beliefs.  Beliefs and belief-like representations are isomorphic: 
they have very similar causal powers on subsequent
processing.[27]  This means that the understanding of fiction
is governed by the same rational standards and norms that
govern the understanding of the actual world.  From this point
of view, belief-like representations duplicate the logic of
beliefs:  if it is reasonable to believe p in the ordinary context,
it is reasonable to imagine p in the fictional context.
The perspective of pseudo-modularity can explain the
mechanism of fictional justification better.  The fictional box is
a workspace in which belief-like representations are temporally
stored and manipulated.  This box is encapsulated:  subjects
know the fictional nature of representations, but at the same
time they suspend the epistemic influence of this knowledge. 
In this way, subjects can play the make-believe game
attending only to the fictional representations as if these were
really believed. However, the encapsulation is partial and soft,
the knowledge of the fictional nature of the representations is
always available in the periphery of consciousness.  For this
reason, subjects can recall this knowledge when they need it.
 In particular, they recall it when they must judge if fictional
representations are plausible and credible.  More precisely,
subjects do not match the fictional representations to actual
states of affairs.  Instead, they evaluate whether the fictional
representations are consistent with patterns of possibility and
opportunity afforded by relevant beliefs about the real world.
From the perspective of the cognitive sciences, it does seem
possible to propose the principle of verisimilitude.  The truth-
value of modal knowledge is justified if subjects judge the
imaginings reasonable, if they judge the possible experiences
prompted by the aesthetic artifacts as acceptable and
convincing, even if these experiences are alternative to real
ones.  The verisimilitude is based on the isomorphism between
belief-like representations and ordinary beliefs.  Fictional
representations are believable if they are consistent with the
conceptual space of possibility drawn by ordinary beliefs about
the real world.  Therefore, just because the fictional box is
softly encapsulated, justification is not a self-sufficient process
restricted to the aesthetic object and its fictional world.  On
the contrary, the ultimate test of aesthetic knowledge is the
external experience.  Only if the belief-like representations
acquired from the AE are useful in refining and deepening our
preliminary understanding of the real world, they re-organize
our knowledge and become part of our mind.  (In Ricoeur’s
terms, they refigurate our comprehension.)
Proficiency challenge.  Even if the AE enables modal knowledge
and confirms its truths, how can aesthetic objects afford
important new beliefs in distinctive ways via means that are
epistemologically significant?  Philosophy produces formal
arguments; science is based on the experimental method.  Is
the AE confined to the individual and ideographic dimension?
 Cognitive sciences, in particular the perspective of grounded
cognition, show how the AE can enable general knowledge.
 This perspective proposes that simulation, as the re-
enactment of motor, sensory, perceptual and introspective
states acquired during experience with the world, constitutes
the basic mechanism of the brain.[28]  
Typically, patterns of re-enactment are activated for
representational use, especially for anticipation and prediction.
 Complex multimodal simulations become active to understand
a situation and to produce continual predictions about what
could happen next.  As a unifying computational principle,
simulation can implement core cognitive functions, even
symbolic inferences and language comprehension. Symbols,
words and concepts acquire their deep informational content
and produce true comprehension only on the basis of
extensive interactions with simulations.[29] To this point, the
research concerning categorization specifies that categories are
organized around prototypes. These may be represented either
by summary representations or exemplars.  The former are
flexible structured lists that include the relevant features
(car/sedan). The latter are concrete instances of the
categories, the best examples of them (car/a particular sedan
model).[30]
In summary, understanding and anticipation require
multimodal simulations that can re-enact both prototypes and
individual tokens.  The aesthetic mechanism of knowing
through fiction implements this general brain device in a
specific form.  Guided by aesthetic artifacts, subjects explore
via imagination a prototypical space of possibility configured
by a concrete and determined example.  This individual token
does not correspond to a discrete factual truth.  Instead, it
configures and anticipates a compressed network of
affordances that goes further and beyond the actual state of
the world.  Therefore, knowing through fiction means learning
on the basis of a simulative exemplification with prototypical
value.  From the epistemic point of view, the AE does not offer
realistic, general and formal reasons as do science and
philosophy.  However, its virtual simulation helps predict
affordances and opportunities different from actual real world
conditions but consistent with possible real world conditions.
Precisely for this reason, aesthetic imagination is at once
reproductive and productive.  From the first point of view,
imagination re-enacts simulative schemata previously
entrenched in memory that allow subjects to recognize the
fictional representation as believable and to involve
themselves in the simulative experience.[31]  From the second
point of view, imagination works creatively on existing
simulative schemata in ways that defy habitual expectations
and convention.  The main creative operations may be
application:  the adaptive use of pre-existing simulative
structures to fit slightly altered situations. 
Analogy:  the transposition of a simulative structure from one
habitual context to another unfamiliar context. Combination:
the integration of different simulative structures into a novel
synthetic frame.  Abstraction:  the discovery of regularities in a
number of different simulative structures.[32]  In general,
creativity may be explanatory or transformational.[33]  The
former is rule-governed, it discovers which types of structure
can be generated within an existing conceptual space.  The
latter is rule-changing, it transforms the existing conceptual
space generating structures that could not be generated
before.  Whatever degree it reaches, aesthetic creativity ties
together reproductive and productive imagination.  A series of
empirical studies show explicitly this relationship in the
ontogenetic development:  pretend play and creativity are
mutually intertwined in children.[34]
From the perspective of the cognitive sciences, it does seem
possible to propose the principle of imaginative
exemplification.  On the basis of a determined fictional
exemplar the AE enables an imaginative simulation that is not
constrained to denote, represent or anticipate a factual state
of affairs.  On the contrary, the imaginative exemplification
compresses a virtual model that can be in principle
universalizable.  It can be applied as a mental reference point
to all the relevant real world scenarios.  As such, this virtual
model has the status of an hypothesis; it has an effective
cognitive value only if it explains past experience with new
insights and predicts future experience more accurately.
5. Evolutionary aesthetics
In summary, the cognitivist view of the AE derived from
cognitive sciences suggests, in general, that Aristotle was
probably right: fiction may be a very serious and powerful tool
for gaining knowledge.  From the point of view of evolutionary
aesthetics, it suggests that AE is a cross-cultural, species-
general predisposition that is, at the same time, both a
function of mental flexibility and cultural creativity and a basic
feature of the human brain that improves the former and
allows the proliferation of the latter.
The AE does not solve practical problems.  According to self-
labeled Darwinian aesthetics, aesthetic preferences are innate
signals of fitness that guide human choices, especially in
intersexual selection of mates.[35]  There are many doubts
that even in the animal kingdom the proximate motivation of
aesthetic preferences can be entirely reduced to their ultimate
fitness value.   Aesthetic features seem to be attractive per se
as sexually stimulating, not as a ground for an inference to the
reproductive capacity of their owners.[36]  However, even if
partially decoupled from any utility for fitness, it is possible
that the AE may have been originally connected with sexual
selection.  As an embodiment of skills and abilities, finely
crafted artifacts may have been counted as reliable indicators
of the maker’s fitness.  It is also plausible to consider the
Acheulean manufacture of hand axes to be the origin of the
“first art.” 
In one million years of production, a practical tool also became
an indicator of fitness and status.[37]  Nevertheless, it is
important to stress that human aesthetics proper slowly
emerges with a playful, fictional, disinterested and non-
utilitarian nature.  It enables virtual domains of
experimentation in which subjects are freed from immediate
and direct responses:  actions, perceptions, beliefs and
emotions are de-constrained from their habitual and proponent
links; subtle relationships are explored and new complex
meanings are discovered.  So, in order to improve knowledge,
the aesthetic imagination has to be set off from mundane life,
from practical problem solving, planning, and hypothesizing.
 Precisely because it is autonomous and independent from
strict functionality, it can play an adaptive role and constitute
an essential and integral part of the evolution of socio-cultural
systems.
The AE does not have a byproduct status.  The AE is not the
product of a single adaptation, such as walking.  Instead, it
initially emerged from, and is continuously supported in its
actual functioning by, multiple systems that evolved for other
purposes.  However, in order to enhance the specific mode of
improving knowledge through fiction making, the AE co-opted
these systems for this new function.  Therefore the AE
emerged neither as a spandrel, that is, a side-effect of these
systems, nor as a mere extension of them.[38]  On the
contrary, it constitutes a re-functionalization (in Gould’s terms,
an exaptation) that imposed upon them a new function and
changed their higher-order relationships.  From this point of
view it is important to stress again that the AE does not
implement a generic function of “blending”[39] and it is not
reducible to a generic “cognitive play with pattern.”[40]  The
AE realizes the epistemic goal of knowledge in a unique form.
 Knowing through fiction is provided by an imaginative
compression with prototypical value.  This virtual
exemplification is embodied in a single aesthetic object.  In its
material presence, the aesthetic object constitutes an open-
ended and continuously renewable potential for recursive
explorations.  As such, it requires direct acquaintance and
cannot be replaced by simple descriptions and explanations.
The AE does not have a single function.  Just because the AE
integrates multiple systems, the function of knowing through
fiction is not exclusive.  The AE may often enhance
communication, cooperation, cohesion, group bonding, shared
experience and collective culture.[41]  It may also serve the
goal of manipulation, propaganda and political control. At least
originally, it may display the artist’s fitness, status and
prestige.[42]  It is often correlated with magical explanations
in which objects acquire hidden causal powers.  
More generally, people may engage in the AE for expressing
themselves or for entertainment.  Anyway, knowing through
fiction represents the core function of the AE.  Other multiple
purposes are additionally imposed upon this main function as
biological or cultural-specific over-goals.  This point is
especially evident in the proposal of “artifying” as “making
special.”[43]  In this perspective the common core of aesthetic
artifacts and performances is to attract attention, sustain
interest, create cognitive order or add emotional salience.
 However, without organizing and sharing a particular form of
knowledge, the function of making special does not have any
specificity.  It constitutes the simple mechanism of attention
triggered by affective relevant stimuli processed in particular
modes (exaggerated, patterned, embellished, repeated, and so
on).
The AE does not constitute a single activity.  The function of
knowing through fiction is obvious in storytelling.  However,
this core function of fiction (intended in the broad sense) is not
restricted to linguistic abilities.  It directly concerns ceremonial
rituals.  These are practices that do not cope with immediate
problems or practical needs.  Instead, they create a
meaningful frame that is different from a natural one.  This
frame explains nature and suggests how to control it (or to
reduce stress because it is not controllable), integrates
members into a group that participate in the same social
organization.  Similarly, body adornments and object
decorations are not only attractants; they constitute the
search for anthropic frames distinguished from natural ones.  
In the same way, music and dance are not literal modes of
communication that convey instrumental information.  To
different degrees, all of these activities have a meaning that
goes beyond their specific physical forms or functional
uses.[44]  They are released from the ordinary use of
information, perceptions, beliefs and abilities.  They duplicate
this use by providing an imaginative space, they explore
alternative possibilities beyond factual constraints.  They
continually expand the space of human experiences.  Even
though the “symbolic art” of the Upper Paleolithic, with its
representational cave carvings, is of course not fictional as
contemporary paintings are, the proper form of the AE
emerged in the ancestral environment of adaptation as adjunct
to different cultural activities aimed at imagining a human
order decoupled from natural pressure.  In this perspective,
the core function of the AE arose gradually and became
conscious progressively, through a long process of
bootstrapping based on recursive interactions among the
available mental systems, cooperation, and cultural creation.
6. Conclusion
A very serious objection may be directed to our approach: not
all works of fiction are aesthetic objects (even less works of
art).  In addition, not all aesthetic objects produce knowledge
(at least to the same degree).  The answer is: it depends on
their value.  So, the basic question is transformed again: what
is aesthetic value?
On the basis of our previous theses, we can suppose that
there is an intimate relationship between the aesthetic value
and the cognitive value.  Knowing through fiction is the
evolved function of the AE.  We can suppose also that the
aesthetic value is not reducible to the cognitive value: knowing
through fiction provides neither general laws as science nor
formal arguments as philosophy.  Our theses on pseudo-
modularity and aesthetic imagination configure a theoretical
space in which it seem possible to explain, again with the aid
of cognitive sciences, both aesthetic pleasure (why the AE is a
self-rewarding source of pleasure in itself) and aesthetic
judgment (why the AA is intertwined with evaluation).
The questions about the aesthetic value, the role of the
aesthetic pleasure, the evaluative nature of the aesthetic
judgment represent the most important missing piece to (a)
form a global theory of the AE in naturalistic terms; (b)
identify completely the common core of the AE; (c) describe
the multiple realizations of this common core; and (d) define
the boundaries of the AE.  However, our space is running out
and next time we will speak about this other intriguing part of
the story.[45]
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